March 03, 2021
The soldiers and organisation-bred command-level
The current structure of "unified headquarters" at Srinagar is a please-all
structure for the top brass that does not force the singularity of objective,
SOPs and operational actions. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba chief Hafiz Saeed’s son-in-law
Khalid Waleed, had reportedly plotted the Pampore attack, with the ready
assistance of local handlers for logistical support. The latest attack in
Pampore followed the same pattern, with the deadly effect of eight CRPF jawans
making the supreme sacrifice. Earlier successes in tackling insurgencies in
Mizoram and Punjab involved hitting the sweet-spot of various governmental
levers. The top field commanders of the Army are necessarily insurgency-hardened
veterans, who perforce have done the requisite tenures and combat exposures in
insurgency zones that is not comparable by the IPS-heavy top brass of the
Central police forces. Endemic corruption and administrative laxity has
accounted for umpteen "packages" (Rs 80,000 crores was announced last year by
the Prime Minister) that have resulted in no perceptible empathy, socio-economic
or infrastructural upliftment of the Valley. The swelling of crowds at militant
funerals and the obvious hardening of local perceptions suggest a worrisome
trend in the Valley.
Tactical success in terms of electoral success by
politicians, number of militants neutralised by the security forces, quantum of
civic spends by the administrators takes precedence over real strategic
progress. While the Army reports to the defence ministry, the BSF, CRPF, SSB and
others report to the home ministry. It is a difficult balance to maintain
between security imperatives and minimal disturbance and interference via
checking and frisking.Successful counter-insurgency is the art of integrating
political, military, economic, psychological and civic actions in a seamless
choreographed manner. The societal structures fomenting the ongoing angst,
mistrust and prejudices require political and civic inputs, as was done in the
case of both Punjab and Mizoram. So when defence minister Manohar Parrikar
remarked "doubt if the standard operating procedure was followed properly", it
was soon dismissed by the CRPF DG who said all laid-down procedures were
"absolutely" adhered to by its personnel. Even after Pampore, the security
lessons are doomed to remain unlearnt. This dangerous security environment has
to be contextualised with the oft-conflicting voices between the political and
security classes — removal of AFSPA, minimal presence of the security apparatus,
etc. In the last seven months, the 35-km stretch between Bijbehera and Pampore
has seen over six attacks on the security forces by the militants. While the
exact lacunas and corrective SOPs are yet to be fleshed out, the problem is a
critical, institutional misalignment of multiple security forces. In the Valley,
the security forces are ploughing a lonely furrow with diminishing returns.
Sadly, even basic requirements like bullet-proof vests and transportation
vehicles are inadequate to minimise casualties.
The soldiers and
organisation-bred command-level officers of the police forces are comparable and
acquit themselves admirably on the field, as in the case of the Pampore incident
where head constable Vir Singh and constable Satish Chand fired back 39 and 32
rounds respectively, before going down fighting. It is a classic ambush
territory/stretch — villages with a sizeable population of overground workers or
sympathisers teem alongside the narrow stretch of the slow moving road. The
nature of conflict is asymmetric, complex and the solution lies in a holistic
and decidedly integrated approach — neither of which is visible today.Even
within the security calculus, the immediate aftermath of Pampore exposed the
operational un-integration and the latent bad blood between the Army and the
Central armed police forces (in this case, CRPF). The writer is a retired
lieutenant- general and a former lieutenant-governor of Andaman & Nicobar
Islands and Puducherry end-of.In the last seven months, the 35-km stretch
between Bijbehera and Pampore has seen over six attacks on the security forces
by the militants. The confusion on analysing the root causes and remedial
measures Din976 of
the security angle will have multiple stakeholders and opinions, outside of the
security fraternity. In a participative democracy like ours, the security forces
can only contain the insurgents and violence to a manageable level (it is
humanely impossible to have zero infiltration on any border of this size,
terrain and conditions).Importantly, Pampore-like incidents are a manifestation
of the political, economic and social frustrations that are beyond the scope of
the security forces. The youth are increasingly ceding ground to fundamentalist
and radical entities. Clearly, the conflict of the "mind and heart" persists and
the political co-option and integration of the misguided elements has yet to
fructify. These unarmed overground workers are priceless in aiding and
facilitating the "shoot & scoot" tactics of the armed militants by melting
into the crowded villages of overground workers, provoking the forces into
potential retaliation in the civilian areas with the prospects of
counter-productive civilian casualties.Common sense dictates that given the
principal role played by the Army (in terms of scope, scale and capabilities —
as also of taking on the additional "policing" tasks like "road opening party"),
the Northern Army Commander ought to be the singular head of a centralised
operational taskforce with multi-dimensional forces and agencies. In Kashmir,
the governmental agencies and policy frameworks operate in silos
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